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in Close Corporations 
Paul G. Mahoney 
A central problem for closely held corporations is the possibility of op- 
portunistic behavior by  a majority shareholder. Many closely held cor- 
porations have a 50 percent-plus  shareholder and one or more owners of 
minority interests. The majority shareholder may use its control of the 
corporate machinery to appropriate wealth from the minority. 
A  growing  literature  examines  how  close  corporation  shareholders 
(through organizational choices) and the legal system (by providing orga- 
nizational default settings and adjudicating disputes) can reduce the costs 
associated with majority opportunism. This paper formalizes the analysis 
by modeling the interaction between majority and minority shareholders 
as a noncooperative trust game. In the game, the majority is constrained 
by  the possibility of nonlegal sanctions, including family or social disap- 
proval and loss of reputation, and, as a result, a rational minority share- 
holder will  sometimes invest despite the potential for exploitation. The 
strength of those sanctions is assumed to vary over time, and the minor- 
ity’s ex ante rational investment can therefore result in ex post appropri- 
ation. 
The paper uses the trust game model to revisit a long-standing debate 
over the best exit rule for minority shareholders in  close corporations. 
Corporations differ from partnerships in that, absent a contrary agree- 
ment, a shareholder can withdraw capital from the firm only pursuant to 
a majority vote, a rule that I call exit by consent.  A partner, by  contrast, 
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can (again absent a contrary agreement) dissolve the firm and withdraw 
capital at will. The ability to withdraw capital gives the minority leverage 
over the majority and may deter opportunism. 
The limited anecdotal and survey evidence available, however, suggests 
that minority shareholders  infrequently contract  for exit rights or other 
organizational devices that might restrict majority opportunism, particu- 
larly in family businesses or other small closely held corporations, with 
which this paper will be concerned.’ There are two schools of thought on 
why this is, or appears to be, so. One holds that transaction costs are to 
blame. Minority shareholders may be ignorant of the potential for appro- 
priation by the majority, and the costs of becoming informed and negotiat- 
ing for effective organizational constraints may be greater than the poten- 
tial benefits. On this view, the default rule for close corporations should 
be switched to provide for easy exit or other organizational constraints as 
a matter of right. Thus, Hetherington and Dooley (1977) argue that close 
corporation shareholders should have the right to withdraw capital at will. 
The alternative  argument  is  that  such  minority  entitlements  do not 
merely  deter majority  opportunism  but  also create a threat of minority 
opportunism. The minority may use a strategically timed exit demand to 
threaten to impose large costs on the majority and thereby gain a larger 
share of the firm’s cash flows. Easterbrook and Fischel(l986, 1991), there- 
fore, argue that the failure of minority  shareholders to bargain for exit 
rights  or other  organizational  constraints does not reflect  ignorance or 
large transaction costs. Instead, it reflects a judgment that, at the margin, 
the organizational benefits of the traditional corporate form outweigh the 
benefits of a more partnership-like  structure. Rock and Wachter (chap. 7 
in this volume) focus on asset specificity and valuation problems as a po- 
tential source of minority  exploitation.  O’Kelley ( 1992) similarly argues 
that the choice of exit rule involves a trade-off between majority and mi- 
nority opportunism. 
The present  paper  notes that  a minority shareholder’s  withdrawal  of 
capital through a buyout or dissolution  takes place at a price set by,  or 
negotiated in the shadow of, a judicial proceeding. Unless judicial valua- 
tions are systematically biased, expanded exit rights for minority  share- 
holders  will  not result  in minority opportunism because  the minority’s 
threat to exit is not credible so long as the majority is cooperating. Con- 
trary to Easterbrook and Fischel’s and O’Kelley’s analysis, then, minority 
1. The universe of  closely held corporations includes some very  large firms. There are 
also publicly traded corporations that have majority shareholders, raising analogous risks of 
majority opportunism. I will confine myself, however, to the problem of majority opportun- 
ism in small businesses organized as closely held corporations. As discussed in section 6.3 
below, the legal solutions developed for large firms are unlikely to work for small firms with- 
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opportunism does not explain the failure to adopt partnership-style gover- 
nance unless judicial valuations are biased or the minority is risk prefer- 
ring or irrational. 
1  therefore explore other possible explanations for the survival of exit by 
consent. Minority shareholders can insure against opportunism through 
the price they pay for the shares. This is not a complete explanation be- 
cause the majority could offer a buyout right in order to reduce the vari- 
ance of the minority’s returns and receive a higher price from risk-averse 
investors. Alternatively, corporate law may do a sufficiently good job of 
constraining majority shareholders that minority shareholders do not find 
it necessary to bargain for exit rights. 
The latter explanation contrasts with frequent criticisms of the courts’ 
willingness to use dissolution or fiduciary duty actions as a form of ex 
post settling up when minority shareholders allege that the majority has 
acted unfairly. Commentators often argue that courts are not competent 
to determine whether the majority has upheld its bargain and that judicial 
intervention therefore produces costly uncertainty. Correctly understood, 
however, judicial intervention to uphold the parties’ “reasonable expec- 
tations” is a sensible adaptation  of the fiduciary principles  that courts 
uncontroversially  enforce against the managers of publicly traded com- 
panies. 
Section 6.1 briefly reviews the debate between proponents of different 
exit rules. Section 6.2 develops the trust game model. Section 6.3 considers 
why, despite the predictions of the model, close corporation shareholders 
do not appear to bargain for exit rules and identifies legal constraints as 
a likely answer. Section 6.4  describes judicial intervention in close corpo- 
rations and the debate over its effectiveness. 
6.1  The Debate over Exit Rules 
Organizational constraints may limit  the majority’s ability to appro- 
priate minority returns. Minority shareholders may bargain for (or a cor- 
porate statute may provide as a default setting) supermajority voting pro- 
visions  for  certain  transactions,  proportional  board representation,  or 
similar organizational devices to reduce the majority’s power to make de- 
cisions unilaterally. The literature on close corporations has focused on a 
particular organizational choice-exit  rules-as  a check on the majority. 
That focus is  not  surprising because corporate exit rules differ sharply 
from those of partnership. 
It should be emphasized that the debate over statutory exit rules seeks 
to choose the optimal default rule-that  is, the rule that should govern 
when the parties have not specified a contrary preference. The default 
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substantial. The higher those costs, the greater the likelihood that some 
parties will be stuck with an undesired rule, and the greater the potential 
social payoff from identifying the most efficient rule. 
6.1.1  The Argument in Favor of Exit at Will as a Default Rule 
Under standard corporate law rules, a shareholder has no right to re- 
ceive a return of his investment from the corporation or other sharehold- 
ers. He may sell to a third party, of course, but, if his desire to exit stems 
from opportunistic behavior by the majority, the purchase price will reflect 
that behavior and therefore provide neither recompense nor deterrence. 
Corporate assets are distributed to shareholders on a dissolution, but that 
typically occurs only pursuant to a majority vote unless a shareholder can 
establish the conditions for a judicial dissolution. 
A general partner of a partnership, by  contrast, has the right to with- 
draw from the partnership on demand and receive the value of his pro 
rata share of the partnership’s assets. Like the exit-by-consent rule of cor- 
porate law, this “exit-at-will’’ rule is a default rule that can be altered by 
agreement. 
Hetherington and Dooley (1977) argue that shareholders in a close cor- 
poration are in a position that closely resembles partnership and that the 
partnership rule of exit at will is appropriate. They propose a statutory 
provision that would give a close corporation shareholder the right to have 
his shares purchased by  the corporation or the other shareholders at an 
agreed-on price or, failing agreement, at a judicially determined price. Al- 
though Hetherington and Dooley identify the key feature of the solution 
as liquidity, an equally important feature is independent valuation. A buy- 
out rule will deter majority opportunism only if the court can be counted 
on to set a price that compensates for the effects of majority misbehavior, 
The put right proposed by Hetherington and Dooley is not the same as 
the partnership exit rule because the latter provides for dissolution of the 
partnership rather than a sale of the partnership interest to the other part- 
ners. The effects of  the two rules, however, are often the same because 
dissolutions of profitable partnerships  typically result  in the remaining 
partners cashing out the departing partner and continuing the business. 
So long as the business is worth more as a going concern than in liquida- 
tion and more in the hands of the current management than in the hands 
of alternative managers, we  would expect a dissolution decree to result 
in a buyout  of the dissenting  shareholder or partner  by  the remaining 
shareholders or partners. Bebchuk and Chang’s (1992) model of bargain- 
ing in bankruptcy (where the alternative to a negotiated solution is a liqui- 
dation) could be adapted to this situation to predict the price at which the 
buyout will take place. 
The argument for facilitating exit by  minority shareholders has influ- 
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exit at will, modern statutory provisions for judicial dissolution provide 
increased  opportunities for minority shareholders to exit. As noted  by 
Thompson (1993), courts have taken an increasingly broad view  of their 
authority under these involuntary dissolution statutes. They have, for ex- 
ample, entertained petitions for dissolution by shareholders claiming that 
actions of the majority have frustrated the “reasonable expectations” of 
the minority. Courts have also used the threat of dissolution to encourage 
a buyout of the minority or have simply used their equity powers to order 
a buyout. These developments are not limited to the United  States; as 
noted by Cheffins (1988), Canadian company law now includes statutory 
provisions that give courts substantial flexibility to define and remedy ma- 
jority opportunism. 
6.1.2  The Argument in Favor of Exit by Consent as a Default Rule 
Easterbrook  and Fischel (1986, 1991) criticize the proponents of exit 
at will for ignoring the risk of minority opportunism that accompanies a 
rule (or contract) giving minority shareholders greater exit rights. Raising 
cash for a buyout (through loans, sales of new shares, or sales of assets) is 
costly. These costs may vary over time, permitting the minority to time its 
exit for maximum strategic advantage. Consider, for example, a situation 
in which the shareholders have private information  suggesting that the 
value of the firm’s future cash flows is greater than expected but do not 
yet have any credible means to signal that information to potential lenders 
or investors. The majority may lack sufficient assets outside the firm to 
buy out the minority, the company’s assets may be illiquid, and the infor- 
mation asymmetry may preclude obtaining outside financing for a buyout 
at an acceptable cost. 
In those circumstances, the argument goes, the cost of exit at will is 
high, and the minority can use the threat of exit to extract a greater share 
of the returns than initially agreed. In general, the buyout or dissolution 
demand can be used opportunistically whenever the cost of replacement 
financing is high. 
Thus, Easterbrook and Fischel argue, the choice of organizational struc- 
ture reflects an inevitable trade-off between majority and minority oppor- 
tunism. Devices such as buyout rights that give the minority leverage over 
the majority decrease the likelihood that the minority will receive less than 
the return to which it is  entitled, but at the cost of increasing the risk 
that it will receive too much. The notion that minority opportunism is an 
inevitable cost of expanded exit rights is widely shared. O’Kelley (1992), 
for example, argues that the choice between partnership and close corpo- 
ration organization represents a trade-off between the greater adaptability 
of partnership and the greater risk of minority opportunism that accom- 
panies exit at will. Rock and Wachter (chap. 7 in this volume) argue that 
the problem of opportunism is acute because close corporation assets are 182  Paul G. Mahoney 
often project specific and have limited value in their next-best use. Disso- 
lution, therefore, may mean the destruction of considerable potential (al- 
though unrealized) value. The “lock-in” feature of exit by consent guards 
against this value destruction. 
Easterbrook and Fischel take the observed tendency of close corpora- 
tion shareholders to accept the default rule of exit by consent as evidence 
that there is not enough difference between the expected cost of majority 
opportunism under exit by consent and minority opportunism under exit 
at will to justify the cost of bargaining around the default rule. They fur- 
ther argue that the costs of bargaining around the rule are not substantial. 
Majority and minority shareholders typically negotiate face to face and 
use lawyers to create the corporation’s governing documents, and it should 
not, therefore, be prohibitively costly to contract around the state-supplied 
default rule when they prefer a different rule. These observations suggest 
that parties are generally satisfied with exit by consent and that legislatures 
and courts should leave well enough alone. 
6.2  The Trust Game 
The interaction between majority and minority shareholders in a close 
corporation can be modeled as a noncooperative trust game in which an 
investor (A) gives money to an entrepreneur  (B). B combines A’s  funds 
with B’s specialized skills to undertake a business organized as a corpora- 
tion. The game begins with  B  offering A a specified share of  the cash 
flows at a specified price, which A must accept or decline. To simplify the 
analysis, I will assume that B always offers A 49 percent of the cash-flow 
rights (represented by  a single class of common stock). By  retaining  51 
percent of the stock, B controls all corporate decisions. The value of the 
firm under B’s management is assumed to be 2r. 
If B’s promise is kept, both parties receive (approximately) equal distri- 
butions, each with a present value of r. Given the price specified by  B, A 
could invest the same amount of money elsewhere to receive a return with 
a present value of s. We can think of s as corresponding to the market rate 
of return and 2(r -  s) as the economic rents generated by the new under- 
taking. 
6.2. I 
A Model without Renegotiation 
Although B promises to split the firm’s cash flows equally with A, B’s 
promise is not binding. That is, it is prohibitively expensive to define BS 
obligations in a way  that  makes  cheating  impossible. To do so would, 
among other things,  require  a complete  specification of  the  salary and 
perquisites  to be  received by  B in  all possible  states and provisions  to 
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guard against surreptitious transfers such as payments of salary to or pur- 
chases of supplies from family members or friends, corporate reimburse- 
ment for personal expenses, and so on. The parties cannot at reasonable 
cost write a contract  that specifies how the equal sharing principle will 
apply in all possible states. Moreover, I assume that A has not contracted 
for exit rights and, therefore, cannot withdraw capital from the firm with- 
out B’s  consent. 
Having obtained A’s  money, B may renege on his promise. In the ex- 
treme, B may implement a “freezeout”-that  is, pay no dividends, termi- 
nate A’s  employment (if any) with the firm, and use all profits to B’s advan- 
tage. B cannot get rid  of A involuntarily except  through a merger that 
would be subject to judicial scrutiny for fairness if challenged by A, but, 
through  the freezeout,  B can appropriate  A’s  entire  share of the firm’s 
cash flows. 
Corporate actions that maximize the wealth transfer from A to B will 
likely be inconsistent with maximizing firm value. For example, if A is an 
employee and B fires A, B may have to hire a replacement employee who 
knows less about the business. By  refusing to pay dividends, B may also 
make the company’s common stock an unattractive vehicle for bonuses or 
other incentive payments to employees. The resulting conflict between the 
shareholders may deflect some of B’s attention from running the business. 
For this reason, the game is not zero sum; B’s opportunism destroys value. 
To capture this feature, I assume that, in a freezeout, A receives a payoff 
of zero and B receives a payoff of unity, where r < 1 < 2r. 
Were B able to freeze out A without constraint, B would always do so. 
Knowing this,  A would  not invest.  There are, however, extralegal  con- 
straints that make opportunism costly to B. Often, the shareholders of a 
close corporation  are relatives or close friends,  and the threat  of social 
disapproval will constrain opportunism.  B may also wish to raise capital 
in the future for this or other business ventures and may therefore care 
about reputation. These informal sanctions impose a cost, m,,  on oppor- 
tunism. A diagram of the game and its payoffs appears in figure 6.1. 
As thus described, the game is the familiar trust game (see, eg,  Kreps 
1990; Brennan, Guth, and Kliemt 1997). After B makes an offer, A decides 
whether to invest (I)  or not to invest (N),  and B then chooses whether to 
reward (R) or to exploit (X).  If r and m, are taken as fixed at the beginning 
of play and known to both parties, the game has a straightforward equilib- 
rium; when r > 1 -  m,,  B will choose not to exploit, and A will therefore 
choose to invest (I,  R);  otherwise,  A will not invest. Under no circum- 
stances will A invest and B exploit. 
This simple, deterministic structure makes the game unrealistic; it can- 
not account  for the observed instances  in which  majority  shareholders 
exploit minority shareholders. Nevertheless, the model demonstrates that 
close corporations  can exist where  shareholders have  rational expecta- 184  Paul G. Mahoney 
Fig. 6.1  Trust game model under exit by consent 
tions, majority shareholders are unable to make binding commitments not 
to exploit, and minority shareholders have no exit rights. 
A more realistic structure must treat r and/or mn as random variables 
whose realizations are unknown at the outset of play. To introduce uncer- 
tainty but keep things reasonably simple, I will make only one of these 
variables, m,,  stochastic. Note that many disputes in close corporations 
arise precisely because m,  varies over time. Family members become es- 
tranged, friendships or  marriages erode, and the strength of informal sanc- 
tions otherwise changes with  time, leading to disputes and exploitative 
behavior. I assume the following: The density function of mn  isf(m,)  on the 
closed interval [0, 11  and zero elsewhere, and the associated distribution 
function and complementary distribution function are F(m,) and O(m& 
respectively. The distribution  is common  knowledge to the parties.  The 
firm value, 2r, is fixed and known throughout to the parties but not verifi- 
able by them to third parties, including the courts. 
Under these assumptions, A's  expected  payoff from investing,  VA, is 
rQ(1 -  r).  If  VA <  s,  A will not invest even though r > s.  B's  inability to 
make a credible promise to share the cash flows will therefore reduce the 
number of corporations created compared to an (unrealistic) baseline in 
which  B could make a credible promise.  It may  also affect the type of 
business that is incorporated.  VA  will tend to be small, all other things 
equal, when  A  and B are strangers.  There will then  be a  tendency  for 
closely  held  corporations to arise most frequently  within  communities 
linked by kinship or other bonds. 
Even when the expected value of m, is such that it is rational for A to 
invest, the variance in m,  and the resulting potential for opportunism re- 
duces the parties'  aggregate payoffs. When  VA  >  s, A will invest but will 
value  the shares in the light of the expected  payoff. In order to induce 
investment with variable m,,  B must offer a higher rate of return (i.e., sell 
the  shares at a  lower price) than he would  were it possible  to make a 
binding commitment  not to behave  opportunistically.  Recall that s,  the 
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price specified by B. B can make A’s  expected payoff from investing greater 
than the payoff from not investing by  offering the shares at a reduced 
price. B’s expected payoff if A invests, VB, is 
rQ(1 - r) +  Ji-’(1 - m,)f(m,)dm,, 
and the total expected payoff to the parties where A invests is 
(1)  VA +  VB =  2r~(1  - r)  +  j;-‘(l - m,>f(m,)cim,. 
It is clear by  inspection that the aggregate payoff is  less than 2r. Thus, 
by  dividing up the right to the firm’s cash flows and thereby creating the 
possibility  of  opportunism,  B  reduces  the aggregate expected  value of 
these entitlements. 
Despite its simplicity, then, the model generates two important results. 
The first is that, in a rational expectations framework, majority opportun- 
ism does not “oppress” the minority in the sense of producing an unex- 
pectedly low return; the minority pays less for the shares because of the 
potential for majority opportunism and on average receives an adequate 
return on the investment. This is  analogous to the familiar result from 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) model of agency costs, in which the agent’s 
compensation is reduced by the expected value of his opportunistic behav- 
ior. The second result is that the outcome of the game is not Pareto opti- 
mal because majority opportunism does not merely transfer wealth from 
the minority to the majority but produces lower aggregate expected pay- 
offs. 
Compare the ex  post payoffs when A invests and B rewards to those 
when A invests and B exploits. In the former case, the aggregate payoff is 
2r. In the latter case, A gets nothing, and B gets 1 -  mB,  for an aggregate 
payoff of 1 -  mB. The difference between the two, 2r - 1 + mB,  consists 
of two components. The first, (2r - l), is that part of the firm’s value 
destroyed by  B’s  choice of inefficient corporate policies in order to freeze 
out A. The second component, m,,  represents B’s socially wasteful invest- 
ments in rent seeking (i.e., his willingness to bear the costs of social sanc- 
tions or loss of reputation). Ex ante, B receives a lower share price reflecting 
the expected loss of firm value and wealth transfer in the event of exploi- 
tation. 
A Model with Renegotiation 
Once the value of m,  is realized, both parties know whether it is in B’s 
interest to exploit. Because B’s  threat to freeze out A is credible given a 
sufficiently low value of m,,  the parties can avoid some of the costs of a 
freezeout if B buys A’s  shares after mB  is realized. B may offer A a price of 
r -  (Y  for A’s  shares, which would leave B with a value of r + CY -  mB  (I 
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in other words, B’s  reputation or social interactions will suffer as a result 
of behaving opportunistically, whether that opportunism operates through 
a freezeout or a purchase of A’s  shares for less than their promised value). 
The bargain would make both parties better off because it would enable 
B to avoid adopting inefficient corporate policies in order to freeze out A 
and, as a result, increase the value of the firm by (2r -  1). 
A may accept B’s offer or reject and make a counteroffer. The situation 
is a bargaining  game as in  Rubinstein  (1982). The parties will agree on 
some value  of a that  divides  between  them  the  difference between  the 
value of the firm absent a freezeout (2r)  and the value of the firm with a 
freezeout (unity). 
With the possibility of renegotiation,  there is no loss in firm value be- 
cause B adopts optimal policies. B nevertheless incurs the cost mB  ex post 
and bears the expected private cost of opportunism to A (represented by 
a)  in the form of a lower ex ante share price. Once again, there is no “op- 
pression” on average so long as A makes unbiased estimates of the rele- 
vant parameters at the beginning of the game. 
6.2.2 
A Model without Renegotiation 
Let us now assume that  the relevant  state’s close corporation  statute 
provides an unconditional buyout right along the lines suggested by Heth- 
erington and Dooley (1977). That is, on request by  A, B must purchase 
(or cause the corporation to purchase) A’s  shares at a negotiated price. If 
the parties cannot agree on the price, it will be determined by the court. I 
will represent the price determined by the court as p and assume that it is 
realized only at the end of the litigation, although prior to litigation the 
parties know its distribution. Because I am for the moment assuming no 
renegotiation,  on a buyout demand by  A, both parties receive the judi- 
cially determined payoffs. 
The buyout right may enable A to behave strategically because a buyout 
can be costly for B.  B may be liquidity constrained and therefore unable 
to purchase A’s  shares from personal resources. In order to make the pur- 
chase, B will then have to sell assets or securities of the corporation, leav- 
ing it with an inefficient mix of assets or an undesired capital structure. A 
change to a more debt-heavy capital structure may violate covenants with 
preexisting lenders or raise the cost of future credit. 
To emphasize the qualitative similarity of these efficiency costs to those 
created when  €3  freezes out A, I will again assume that the value of the 
firm decreases to unity after a strategically  timed buyout demand by  A. 
Like B in figure 6.1, A is constrained by informal sanctions that impose a 
cost, mA,  on opportunism. Whether A’s  buyout demand was prompted by 
B’s exploitation or was opportunistic is assumed to be common knowledge 
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Fig. 6.2  Trust game model under exit at will 
within the relevant community, with the result that A bears the cost m, if 
and only if his buyout demand was opportunistic. 
The resulting game is diagrammed in figure 6.2. As in the prior model, 
A decides whether to invest or not to invest, and B then decides whether 
to reward or to exploit. If B exploits, A will clearly choose to exercise the 
buyout right (X,  Dj, which will reduce A's  losses from exploitation. If B 
rewards, however, A can choose to reward as well (R,  C) or to exploit by 
making a strategically timed buyout demand (R,  D). 
There is an important distinction between the games in figures 6.1 above 
and 6.2. In the latter, it may never be rational for A to exploit (demand a 
buyout) when B rewards. If the court's valuation is unbiased (i.e., if E[p]  = 
r, where E is the expectation operator), then A's expected payoff from re- 
warding (r) always exceeds the expected payoff from a buyout  (E[p] - 
m,  = r -  m,j,  given B's  decision to reward. 
A contrary result requires one of several assumptions. First, A may be 
risk preferring  and therefore willing to gamble on the court's  valuation 
being too high. Second, the court's valuation may be systematically biased 
in A's favor (i.e., E[p]  > r). Third, A may be motivated by  spite or other- 
wise irrational-that  is, willing to impose large costs on B even though 
the expected outcome is less favorable to A than continued cooperation. I 
assume for the time being that one of these conditions holds so that A 
may choose to exploit, but in  section  6.2.3,  I return to the distinction 
between the games in figures 6.1 and 6.2. 
The losses from A's opportunism are qualitatively similar to those from 
B's.  The reduction in payoffs when B rewards and A exploits, compared 
to when both reward, is 2r -  [(p -  m,)  + (1 -  p)],  or (2r - 1) + m,. 
Recall that, in the no-renegotiation exit-by-consent model, when A invests 
and B exploits through a freezeout, the difference in payoffs is (2r -  1) + 
m,. A will pay a higher price for the shares than he would pay could he 188  Paul G. Mahoney 
make a credible promise never to exploit, and again the deal is “fair” in 
that sense. 
A Model with Renegotiation 
If A can make a credible threat to exploit, A might offer to avoid the 
court-supervised  buyout  and negotiate a buyout  that would not signifi- 
cantly reduce the firm’s value.  For example,  A might  agree to accept a 
note rather than cash in payment for the shares in order to alleviate B’s 
liquidity problem. As in the model of majority opportunism, renegotiation 
could permit A to receive a wealth transfer from B without destroying 
part of the value of the firm. If  p is the amount of the wealth transfer, 
then the payoffs to A and B when B rewards and A exploits are (r + p - 
m,)  and (r - p),  respectively. The result is analogous to that in section 
6.2.1 above. 
6.2.3  Will A Exploit? 
The games diagrammed in figures 6.1 and 6.2 are similar but not identi- 
cal, and the differences suggest that buyout rights do not necessarily re- 
place  majority  opportunism  with minority opportunism.  Under exit by 
consent, B is constrained only by informal sanctions-B’s  control of the 
corporate machinery  makes it otherwise possible  to appropriate  all the 
firm’s cash flows. By contrast, the buyout made possible by an exit-at-will 
rule takes place in the shadow of a judicial valuation of the firm.? Unless 
that valuation is biased (putting aside the possibility that A is risk prefer- 
ring or irrational), A’s  threat to demand a buyout is not credible when B 
has rewarded. As a consequence, B cannot be induced to bribe A to forgo 
the buyout. 
In order to illustrate the point as simply as possible, I have used a one- 
shot game in which the strength of the informal  sanctions, mA  and mB, 
is  exogenously  determined.  The sanctions  could  be  endogenized  in  a 
repeated-game  framework in which B may sell equity and A may invest 
multiple times, either with one another or with additional players. When 
either party exploits, he reveals himself to be an exploiting “type” (i.e., 
one subject to low informal sanctions), as in the repeated-game model of 
Kreps et al. (1982). Once player B is known as an exploiter, future inves- 
tors will expect a lower payoff from investing, which will in turn reduce 
B’s expected payoffs. 
Depending on his discount rate, B may be willing to give up future gains 
for the opportunity to exploit today. Player A is once again, however, in a 
2. Unlike a statutory right, a contractual buyout right might not incorporate judicial valu- 
ation, but it would have to incorporate some valuation procedure if the parties cannot reach 
agreement. That valuation procedure would play the role of a court’s valuation in the analysis 
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different position because he does not experience an immediate gain in 
expected-value terms from exploiting. Moreover, it does not seem plau- 
sible that A’s  decision to exploit today could improve (rather than reduce) 
his future payoffs. Having been  revealed as an exploiter, A will not get 
additional opportunities to invest, as an entrepreneur would always do bet- 
ter in expected-value terms to pick a new investor who might or might not 
be an exploiter, 
The credible-threat argument on which I have relied requires unbiased 
judicial  valuations.  If judges routinely  overcompensate  minority share- 
holders, it may be rational for the minority to exploit. Easterbrook and 
Fischel’s (1986, 1991) argument that exit at will creates a risk of minority 
exploitation appears to reflect an underlying assumption that judicial val- 
uations are systematically too high. Easterbrook and Fischel focus in par- 
ticular on a wrong turn taken by the courts in Massachusetts and Califor- 
nia.3  These courts have adopted a rigid “equal treatment” rule that entitles 
the minority to equal pro rata sharing (in amount, timing, and form) of 
all cash flows. If  followed routinely, that approach would systematically 
overcompensate minority shareholders. In order to maximize firm value, 
shareholders are often willing to provide specific financial incentives for 
the majority shareholder-managers. Such incentives are inconsistent with 
equal treatment. The Massachusetts/California approach would allow mi- 
nority shareholders to escape from these deals ex post, thereby creating a 
threat of minority exploitation. 
The Massachusetts and California cases, however, may be aberrations. 
Courts in  many  states  scrutinize managers  of  close corporations  more 
closely than they do managers of publicly traded corporations, but these 
courts have generally not applied a rigid equal treatment rule.4 While we 
cannot reject the possibility that courts systematically overcompensate mi- 
nority shareholders and majorities consequently refuse to agree to buyout 
rights, for most states (including Delaware), the evidence is equally consis- 
tent with unbiased valuation. 
6.3  Why Don’t Shareholders Bargain for Buyout Rights? 
There is no large-sample evidence on the extent to which shareholders 
in closely held corporations bargain for buyout rights. It is widely believed 
by  lawyers and commentators, however, that they  do so rarely  (Dooley 
1995). A survey of practicing lawyers found that deviations from the state- 
3. See Donuhue v.  Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d  505 (1975); Jones v. 
H. F: Ahmunson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal.  1969). 
4. See, e.g.,  Toner  v.  Bultimore Envelope  Co., 498 A.2d 642 (Md. 1985); Deluhoussuye  v. 
Newhard, 785 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). The Delaware Supreme Court explicitly de- 
clined to adopt an equal treatment rule in a case similar to Donahue (see Nixon v.  Bluckivell, 
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supplied default  settings are uncommon (Hochstetler  and Svejda  1985). 
The reported judicial opinions concerning the valuation  of close corpo- 
rations, moreover, arise in the context  of statutory dissolution proceed- 
ings, not contractual buyout rights, suggesting that the latter may be un- 
common. 
If buyout  rights do not create a significant  risk  of opportunism,  as I 
have  argued,  what  explains minority  shareholders’  apparent failure  to 
bargain for them? The most common responses are that minority share- 
holders  fail to appreciate the danger of majority  opportunism  (O’Neal 
and Thompson  1985; Bradley  1985) or that the costs of bargaining for a 
buyout  right  are prohibitively  high. Johnston  (1992) demonstrates that, 
when the parties have private information about their proclivity to exploit, 
it may be difficult to bargain to the desired rule without revealing more 
information than the parties wish. 
It would also be possible to create a model in which A and B are asym- 
metrically informed about the value of the firm. Under some values of the 
parameters representing A’s  and B’s  beliefs about firm value, exit by con- 
sent could be superior to exit at will. However, the prior literature focuses 
on the difficulty of  verifying firm value  to a court, rather than on the 
parties’ differing beliefs about firm value, as the source of A’s  ability to 
exploit. Using the trust game model, I have shown that the inability to 
verify firm value to third parties is not sufficient to enable A to exploit. 
The following sections explore two alternative explanations  for the sur- 
vival of exit by consent that do not require an assumption of shareholder 
ignorance, private information about firm value, or high transaction costs. 
6.3.1  Price Protection 
In the trust game model, the minority pays a price that reflects its ex- 
pected losses from majority opportunism. The exit rule would be a matter 
of indifference to a well-informed minority shareholder as the shareholder 
can pay a price that reflects the expected utility loss. When opportunism 
may destroy part of the firm’s value, however, the majority is made worse 
off  by  the prospect of its own opportunism. The majority,  therefore, has 
an incentive to select the most efficient rule and, therefore, to offer a buy- 
out right if the buyout right reduces majority opportunism at an accept- 
able cost. 
The destruction of firm value, however, can be substantially reduced by 
ex  post renegotiation,  not merely by  ex  ante contracting.  In the model 
developed in section 6.2.1 above, where renegotiation  is possible, the ex- 
pected decrease in the parties’ aggregate payoffs due to B’s opportunism is 
The net loss, in other words, is the cost of social or other sanctions im- 
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state the obvious, B exploits only when these costs are small. Investment 
takes place only when E(m,) > 1 -  r, and exploitation occurs only when 
the realized value of m, is less than 1 -  r. The expected losses from oppor- 
tunism are therefore increasing in the variance of m,. Shareholders may 
choose to negotiate for buyout rights (or form a partnership rather than a 
corporation) only when that expected variance is large. 
Nevertheless, price protection cannot fully explain majority sharehold- 
ers’ failure routinely to offer buyout rights. A risk-averse minority would 
demand compensation not only for the expected reduction in wealth but 
also for the greater variance of outcomes produced by majority opportun- 
ism. Close corporation shareholders, who often invest a significant por- 
tion of their wealth or effort in the business, are likely risk averse with re- 
spect to their returns from the corporation. The majority could obtain a 
higher price by offering greater protection against opportunism and there- 
fore lower variance of returns. 
6.3.2  Fiduciary Duty Constraints 
Holderness and Sheehan (chap. 5 in this volume) argue that the fidu- 
ciary duties imposed by corporate law constrain large-block shareholders 
in publicly traded firms from appropriating wealth from minority share- 
holders. They reach the conclusion by process of elimination, noting that 
organizational and capital market constraints do not explain the survival 
of the controlled public company. A similar point can be made with re- 
spect to majority shareholders in closely held corporations. The organi- 
zational devices that commentators have suggested to combat majority 
opportunism, such as buyout rights, do not appear to be used, yet close 
corporations survive as a common business form. A plausible reason is 
that corporate law provides sufficient constraints. 
It does not follow automatically from the fact that fiduciary constraints 
are effective in publicly traded corporations with controlling shareholders 
that they would also be effective in close corporations because there are 
important differences between the two. Judicial intervention in publicly 
traded corporations is most common when there is an allegation of man- 
agement  self-dealing. Where  there  is  no  such  allegation, the business- 
judgment rule shields management’s business decisions from judicial scru- 
tiny.  Managers must justify  self-interested transactions,  by  contrast, as 
“entirely fair” to  shareholder^.^ 
These constraints  are looser where small close corporations are con- 
cerned  because low levels of self-dealing are ubiquitous, accepted, and 
probably cost effective in this context. Many closely held corporations are 
family businesses in which family members of the controlling shareholder 
may be employees, suppliers, or customers of the business. The board of 
directors of a family business is unlikely to have an independent compen- 
5. See, e.g., Weinherger  Y.  UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 192  Paul G. Mahoney 
sation committee. Shareholder monitoring  is  also more difficult in  the 
case of a close corporation compared to a publicly traded corporation, as 
the latter are subject to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s proxy 
rules, which require disclosure of self-dealing transactions  and relation- 
ships.6 
The  smaller  size  of  the  classic close corporations with  which  I  am 
concerned, compared to the typical publicly traded corporation, also com- 
plicates judges’ attempts to police majority behavior by scrutinizing self- 
dealing. Consider a firm that pays its CEOlcontrolling shareholder a sal- 
ary of $100,000 per year and has annual profits (after payment of salaries) 
of $200,000 per year. If the minority owns 49 percent  of the stock, the 
directors can appropriate about a quarter of the profits that the minority 
would otherwise receive by raising the CEO’s salary by  50 percent. Con- 
trast this to a company that pays its controlling shareholder/CEO $1 mil- 
lion per year and has annual profits of $500 million. Doubling the CEO’s 
pay would appropriate less than  1 percent of the 49  percent minority’s 
share of profits. It is of course possible for a CEO to receive compensation 
measured in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, but amounts that 
large are typically tied to the performance of the company’s stock, which 
mitigates the wealth-transfer component of the compensation. 
The amounts at stake in publicly traded corporations are such that the 
controlling  shareholder  can  appropriate  a  large  fraction  of  minority- 
shareholder wealth primarily through an extraordinary transaction  such 
as a management buyout, a cash-out merger, or a recapitalization. Not sur- 
prisingly, courts pay the closest attention to these transactions and apply 
a stringent fairness test. The controlling shareholder of a small close corpo- 
ration, by contrast, can appropriate a significant fraction of the minority’s 
stake through everyday transactions that courts cannot scrutinize with the 
same care. 
This suggests that the law constrains the controlling shareholder of a 
typical close corporation less effectively than it does the controlling share- 
holder of a typical publicly traded corporation if  courts apply identical 
forms and levels of scrutiny to each. This is not, however, what the courts 
have done. Instead, they have adapted the inquiries that they make to fit 
the close corporation context. Courts and commentators have often erred 
in identifying the problem-they  argue that the difference between public 
and close corporations stems from illiquidity or the “intense relationship” 
between close corporation shareholders (see O’Neal and Thompson 1985), 
rather than the fact that large-scale appropriation in the public company 
context, unlike the close corporation context, usually involves an extraor- 
dinary transaction. Nevertheless, courts have developed a set of responses 
to majority opportunism, described  in the next section, that appear to 
deter such appropriation. 
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6.4  Judicial Scrutiny in Close Corporations 
As noted above, a common setting for judicial intervention  on behalf 
of the shareholders of a publicly traded company is a breach-of-fiduciary- 
duty suit challenging an extraordinary transaction  such as a merger or 
recapitalization. In a close corporation, by  contrast, the majority often 
has no need to rid itself of the minority in order to appropriate a large 
share of the minority’s wealth. Thus, the most common setting for inter- 
vention is a minority shareholder’s suit for dissolution of the corporation 
on the grounds of “oppressive” conduct by the majority.’ 
Although statutes are typically silent on what constitutes oppressive 
conduct and court decisions describe oppression in various ways, Hayns- 
worth (1987) notes that many courts now ask whether conduct of the major- 
ity is inconsistent with the “reasonable expectations” of the minority. The 
majority and minority are assumed to have entered into the relationship 
with certain understandings of how the firm’s cash flows would be shared, 
which they could not reduce to well-defined obligations for all possible 
states. The court’s objective is to determine the parties’ expectations re- 
garding the allocation of cash flows and enforce those expectations. 
Courts have also become willing to fashion equitable remedies other 
than the all-or-nothing remedy of dissolution. These remedies may include 
money damages, rescission of a transaction  found to have violated the 
majority’s fiduciary duties, or an order to pay a special dividend. Thomp- 
son (1993) details these remedial choices and notes that they have made 
the action for dissolution resemble a standard breach-of-fiduciary-duty ac- 
tion. He argues that the two distinct causes of action are gradually evolv- 
ing into a single cause of action for oppression in which the substantive 
inquiry is whether the majority’s actions are consistent with the parties’ 
reasonable ex ante expectations and the court can apply a wide range of 
remedies. 
The strategy is consistent with courts’ behavior faced with long-term 
contracts in which it is prohibitively costly to specify the parties’ required 
actions in all states. Legal scholars often call these transactions relational 
contracts (see Goetz and Scott 1981). Close corporations fit the paradigm 
because the parties’ failure to build in specific protections against the ma- 
jority appropriating wealth from the minority is plausibly a result, not of 
their desire to permit such appropriation, but rather of the prohibitive cost 
of writing a contract to achieve that result. To the extent that courts can 
supply implicit contract terms that are consistent with the parties’ prefer- 
ences, they can reduce the cost of forming close corporations. 
The trend toward greater judicial intervention in close corporations has 
7. See Model Act, sec. 14.30 (court may dissolve a corporation in an action by a share- 
holder if  shareholder establishes that “the directors or those in control of the corporation 
have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent”). 194  Paul G. Mahoney 
been strongly criticized, however. Commentators argue that judicial valu- 
ation  errors will  ensure  that  these remedies  do more harm than good. 
Ribstein (1994,959, for example, states that judge-made or statutory “op- 
pression”  remedies  “create  a  potential judicial  ‘wild card’  that  creates 
costly uncertainty.” Gevurtz (1 996, 288) argues in favor of greater organi- 
zational protections for minority shareholders but contends that discre- 
tionary judicial intervention is an inferior solution because it “is likely to 
be  no more accurate than flipping a coin.” Oesterle (1995, 883) argues 
that legislative experimentation  with waivable fiduciary duties in limited- 
liability  statutes has  been  driven  by  dissatisfaction  with judicial  “med- 
dling” in close corporation governance.8 
What commentators have described as a greater degree of intervention 
in close corporation governance can be better understood as an adapta- 
tion of standard  fiduciary principles to the close corporation  setting. In 
publicly  traded  corporations,  courts have  relied  almost  exclusively on 
process-based  standards for evaluating the behavior  of corporate direc- 
tors. So long as directors follow appropriate  procedures,  their behavior 
will survive judicial scrutiny, and, absent appropriate procedures, even ac- 
tions that create significant shareholder wealth can result in liabilit~.~  By 
contrast, courts have paid more attention to outcomes when close corpo- 
rations are concerned. Because the managers of a small close corporation 
can appropriate a significant  share of the minority’s cash flows through 
day-to-day  operations,  courts  have  paid  attention  to the  substance  of 
those operations. 
6.5  Conclusion 
Legislatures, courts, and commentators  have devoted considerable at- 
tention  to the problem  of  majority  opportunism in close corporations. 
Minority exit rights, in the form of easily available judicial dissolution or 
legislatively granted or contractual buyout provisions, have generated the 
greatest controversy. Contrary to the views of recent commentators, it is 
not obvious that minority shareholders could use exit rights to extort a 
greater share of the cash-flow rights from the majority. More generous exit 
rights may be unnecessary,  however, as a result of the courts’ ability to 
deter majority  opportunism  through  statutory dissolution  and “oppres- 
sion” proceedings. 
8.  Oesterle’s  main  point-that  fiduciary  duties,  buyout  rights,  and  other protections 
should be waivable by contract-is  correct whether or not courts do  a good job of identifying 
and remedying majority misconduct. Some parties will be able to design effective organiza- 
tional mechanisms to obtain their desired outcomes, and such parties should be able to rely 
on self-help in preference to judicial intervention. 
9. See Smith v.  Van Gorkom. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In Vun Gorkom, the board obtained 
what appeared to be a high price in a sale of the company, but the Delaware Supreme Court 
concluded that the board’s deliberations were too hasty and found the board members liable 
for a breach of fiduciary duty. Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations  195 
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Comment  Larry Y.  Dann 
The study by Paul Mahoney adds to the growing body of literature that 
examines highly concentrated  ownership in corporations. Discussion of 
mechanisms for resolving disputes between minority and majority share- 
holders in closely held, private corporations has been a topic of attention 
in the legal literature for at least twenty years, but, until recently, most of 
the attention paid in the financial economics literature to highly concen- 
trated ownership has been confined to publicly traded corporations. In- 
creasingly, however, financial economists are analyzing the institutional 
arrangements of companies in the “prepublic” stage of development. Con- 
sequently, this study, which uses a game-theoretic model to shed light on 
the  economic  and  legal  issues  of  potential  opportunistic  behavior  by 
shareholders, lies at an interesting and expanding intersection of the legal 
and financial economics literatures. 
The paper focuses specifically on so-called exit rules-arrangements  by 
which shareholders in closely held corporations can cash out their owner- 
ship stakes. The absence of a public market for the firm’s shares, and the 
possibility of opportunistic behavior by both minority and majority own- 
ers, makes specification of the exit rule potentially important. Debate in 
the legal literature has centered on the economic efficiency of the default 
exit rule, that is, identifying the default rule that minimizes the aggregate 
value  loss  from  shareholders  behaving  opportunistically.  By  modeling 
shareholder opportunism in a simple setting, Mahoney sharpens the focus 
of the debate. The conclusion that he reaches, that the threat of minority- 
shareholder opportunism may have been overstated by earlier writers on 
the subject, and the reasons why  we  rarely  observe contractual  buyout 
rights for minority shareholders are examined in turn. 
The model consists of one minority shareholder (A) and one majority 
shareholder (B). Each may be able to behave opportunistically  (capture 
value belonging to the other) but incurs a reputational cost of doing so. 
In addition,  the model  assumes a loss in corporate value  from  actions 
taken  by  B to exploit A and/or from B’s  adjustments to opportunistic 
actions taken by  A. Under exit by consent (the normal corporate  rule 
whereby a shareholder can sell his or her shares back to the corporation 
only if approved by the majority of shareholders), B will find it advanta- 
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geous to expropriate value from A (via withholding dividend payments, 
terminating A's employment, etc.) when B's  reputational cost of doing so, 
mB,  is low. Reputational costs will be high for B when (a) B's  relationship 
with A consists of more than just co-ownership of shares (e.g., B and A 
are family members, friends, or members of a small community, etc.) or 
(b)  B is likely to be  seeking capital market  resources in the future and 
knowledge of BS opportunism will affect his or her future capital market 
dealings. Under the alternative regime of exit at will (akin to the partner- 
ship dissolution rule, which permits any owner to demand that the busi- 
ness buy back the owner's claim), A might time the buyout demand to B's 
disadvantage (e.g., when B does not have the personal resources to buy 
A's  claim and the cost of raising capital is high). Demanding a buyout at 
such a time would benefit A if either (a) renegotiation with B is possible 
such that B buys out A at a high price or (6) A expects a judicially deter- 
mined buyout price that favors A over B. A's  reputational cost of making 
an opportunistic buyout demand is mA. 
Under each exit-rule regime, the game is modeled both with and with- 
out the opportunity for renegotiation between B and A. This highlights 
two aspects of the game. One is that renegotiation between B and A allows 
for the possibility that  the loss in corporate value from adopting non- 
value-maximizing policies can be avoided (although the reputational costs 
are still borne).  Thus, ex  post  renegotiation  limits the social loss from 
opportunism. The second is the apparent asymmetry of the consequences 
of  opportunism by  B versus by  A. Since B controls corporate decision 
making, B can and will exploit A when mB  is sufficiently low. Judicial in- 
tervention does not limit B in the model since B can freeze out A (drive 
A's  payoff to 0). For A credibly to exploit B, however, A needs help. A's 
threat of opportunistic behavior will be credible only if A can benefit from 
the behavior. This requires either the possibility of renegotiation such that 
A can expropriate some of the value of B's  claim to the firm or, absent 
renegotiation,  an expected  judicial determination that favors A over B. 
Without either renegotiation  or judicial bias, the paper correctly argues, 
it may never be rational for A to behave opportunistically. However, if 
either judicial bias favoring A over B or even the less stringent assumption 
of unbiased judicial intervention were an element of the exit-by-consent 
regime, the conditions under which B would rationally exploit A are also 
reduced. It appears that the consequence of allowing the existence of a 
judicial remedy, consistently invoked, for whether the choice of a default 
exit-rule regime is important depends on the costs of seeking the judicial 
intervention. 
In section 6.3, Mahoney explains why  the model treats the element of 
judicial intervention differently across the two exit-rule regimes. This sec- 
tion offers some of the best insights in the paper, especially for financial 
economists who (like me) are not extensively informed about the differ- 198  Paul G. Mahoney 
ences in legal treatment of the minority/majority-shareholder situation for 
closely held versus publicly traded corporations. In essence, one argument 
is that detection of majority-shareholder  exploitation  of minority share- 
holders  (e.g., by  shareholder monitoring) is more costly in closely held 
corporations than publicly traded  ones because of the more limited re- 
porting  requirements  regarding  self-dealing  transactions  and  relation- 
ships. Furthermore, since there are significant fixed costs to policing self- 
dealing, it is uneconomic to scrutinize judicially the small-scale valuation 
consequences of majority-shareholder opportunism in many closely held 
corporations. 
Section 6.3 also explains why the model in this paper reaches a different 
conclusion about the threat of minority-shareholder opportunism than do 
such earlier writers as Easterbrook and Fischel (1986, 1991) and O’Kelley 
(1992).  Mahoney  models  behavior  by  the  minority  shareholder as oc- 
curring in response to observed behavior by the majority shareholder. In 
contrast, he argues, the analysis underlying Easterbrook and Fischel and 
O’Kelley does not treat the choices made by B and A as sequential. Maho- 
ney asserts that the natural sequence of play captured by his model is more 
realistic, and I tend to agree, but the point is that one important thing that 
we learn from the explicit modeling is the reason for the different conclu- 
sions being reached. Explicit specification of the form of the game envi- 
sioned sharpens the analysis. 
One empirical regularity that the game does not explain is why we  so 
infrequently observe minority shareholders obtaining, or apparently even 
seeking, a contractual buyout right. Mahoney posits that one explanation 
is that intervention  by  the courts has worked  well as a minority-share- 
holder safeguard. While this conclusion is not as strong as one reached 
affirmatively from the analysis (instead of being arrived at by  ruling out 
posited alternative explanations), it is nevertheless at least as plausible as 
any of the other alternatives mentioned. Further analysis to address this 
conjecture would be a valuable contribution. 
Two additional questions arise from this study that, with further investi- 
gation, would advance our understanding of the extent of opportunistic 
behavior among shareholders in the closely held corporation. One ques- 
tion is how the game would change if the reputational costs of opportun- 
ism, mB  and mA,  are not known by the other player. Second, as one whose 
heart ultimately  lies with empirical analysis,  I would  find it interesting 
(although obtaining data would be challenging) to test the empirical impli- 
cation of the reputation model that we are more likely to observe exit-at- 
will rules or exit rights bargained for when minority shareholders do not 
have a personal relationship with the majority shareholder. Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations  199 
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